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ABSTRACT

With the advantage of not having to memorize long passwords, facial authentication
has become a topic of interest among researchers. However, since many users store images
containing their face on social networking sites, a new challenge emerges in preventing
attackers from impersonating these users by using these online photos. Another problem
with most current facial authentication protocols is that they require an unencrypted image
of each registered user’s face to compare against. Moreover, they might require the user’s
device to execute computationally expensive multiparty protocols which presents a problem
for mobile devices with limited processing power. Finally, these authentication protocols
will not be able to be implemented in real systems because they take too long to execute.
In this paper, we present a novel privacy preserving facial authentication system, called
UFace. Not only does UFace limit the amount of computation for a user’s mobile device,
but it also prevents unencrypted images from leaving a user’s possession while finishing the
authentication protocol within seconds. Web services can now outsource their authentication protocol to UFace so that each web service only needs to handle its own functionality.
UFace guarantees that it can correctly authenticate each user with 90% accuracy, prevent
attacks from using online photos and that all data used in the authentication protocol is done
on encrypted randomized data. In other words, only the user can see the facial image and
feature vector used for authentication; all other parties execute the protocol using seemingly random information. UFace was implemented through two facets: a mobile client
application to obtain and encrypt the feature vector of each user’s facial image, and a server
protocol to securely authenticate a feature vector using secure multiparty computations.
The experimental results demonstrate that UFace can be used as a third party authentication
tool for any number of web services.
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1. INTRODUCTION

Many websites today require users to create an account with a username and password to utilize the web service fully. Statistics [Tagat, 2012] show that each Internet user
has an average of 26 different online accounts, with individuals between the age of 25 to 34
having an average of 40 accounts each. With so many different accounts - and thus, many
needed passwords - some passwords are bound to be reused or changed ever so slightly due
to the challenge of memorizing many different passwords. The surprising fact is that a person uses, on average, just 5 unique passwords for all their accounts [Tagat, 2012]. However,
using the same password across multiple accounts has opened the door to attackers and is
becoming the main cause of the dramatic rise in online fraud. For example, if 1 web service
is hacked and all of the passwords are released, then the attackers could have your password
for multiple different websites if the same password was reused.
The question this paper aims to solve: Is there a way that does not require individuals
to memorize many different passwords while still preventing attackers from accessing
confidential information? Face authentication is one potential solution to this. This tool
means users will only need to send an image of their face (or a feature vector representing
their face in this case) to prove their identities - much easier than trying to remember
the password that correlates with the service being used. Since face authentication is a
relatively new technology, it still needs to overcome several critical challenges: maintaining
high accuracy of authenticating a user’s face, preventing masquerade attacks by using
old images found on social media websites, preserving privacy of users’ information that
have been used for authentication, and accomplishing authentication in real-time. The
accuracy of authenticating based on facial recognition is no longer a major concern since
certain algorithms can achieve an accuracy of over 90% [Tan and Triggs, 2010]. However,
the remaining challenges have not been well addressed. Specifically, in existing face
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authentication systems, it is possible for attackers to reuse the photos obtained from social
networks and then be authenticated as the photo owners. To prevent such impersonation,
the latest technique is face liveness detection [Li et al., 2015]. Unfortunately, the face
liveness detection approach has recently also been proved to be vulnerable by researchers
[Xu et al., 2016] who can create realistic 3D facial models with a handful of pictures from
social media to spoof the face liveness detection.
To overcome these security and privacy challenges during facial authentication and
enable its wide adoption in web services, this paper proposes a novel privacy-preserving
face authentication system, called UFace, where “U" stands for both “your" and “universal".
The main idea is that users will take extremely close-up images of their face that will only
be used for authentication purposes using their mobile devices. These close-up images are
rarely shared online and can thus be used for authentication purposes. The reason they are
not shared online comes from the fact that the focal point is much closer to the user’s face
and thus causes the shape of the face to change and appear more narrow. Plus, when people
do post close-up pictures online, these images do not match the specifications UFace desires
when taking pictures and would not work within the system. The experiments run also show
that these close-up images cannot be duplicated by attackers. If the attacker tries to use a
device with the same camera capabilities and zooms in to take the victim’s photo from a
distance, then the face will have a different appearance due to the camera’s focal point being
further from the face. The face will seem to be more round and the UFace system will be
able to see this change and prevent authentication. If the attacker tries to crop a face of
the user found online, then once again the face will have a different appearance due to the
same reasoning as before and thus will prevent authentication. So, now that a specific type
of image has been identified for authentication, how can that information remain safe so no
attacker can gain access to the data and reuse it? To achieve this, UFace has an efficient
and secure privacy-preserving authentication protocol that keeps each user’s image private
during the entire procedure. The first step is to convert the image of a user’s face to a feature
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vector and delete the original image. Afterwards, the feature vector is then encrypted before
being transferred to begin the authentication protocol. Thus, the data stored in the UFace
system is an encrypted feature vector of each user’s facial image and not the facial image
nor the unencrypted feature vector. It is worth noting that this work is unique compared
to existing privacy-preserving face authentication approaches [Erkin et al., 2009] which all
require the authentication server to maintain a database of each user’s facial images. If using
an existing face authentication protocols to authenticate close-up facial images, an attacker
will still be able to obtain the user’s close-up images after compromising the authentication
servers and will be able to impersonate the users later on. In UFace, even if the attacker
compromises the authentication servers, he/she will only obtain encrypted facial image
feature vectors and cannot reuse them for authentication (detailed security analysis will be
presented in Section 8).
As shown in Figure 1.1, the UFace system involves four parties: (1) end users, (2) web
service providers, (3) UFace data servers, and (4) UFace key servers. UFace is a third party
that hosts two authentication servers to facilitate privacy-preserving authentication between
web service providers and end users (through mobile devices). An UFace application will
be installed on the user’s mobile device. When the user wants to log into a web service
(already registered with UFace), the user just needs to take a photo while the application
creates a unique feature vector and encrypts it in the background. Once the encrypted
feature vector is sent to the UFace data server, the UFace system will then carry out a secure
multiparty computation with the UFace key server to authenticate the user with the web
service. The technical contributions are summarized as follows:
• UFace is built in a multi-cloud environment and can serve authentication for multiple
web services simultaneously. Its authentication protocol prevents the disclosure of
any users’ data to any party participating in the protocol: (1) web services, (2) UFace
data servers, and (3) UFace key servers.

4

Figure 1.1. UFace system authentication overview

• UFace utilizes an efficient garbled circuit based authentication protocol which allows
the two UFace servers to collaboratively conduct feature vector comparison on encrypted data. The encrypted data is based on Paillier’s cryptosystem which allows for
certain homomorphic encryption operations. The protocol required mapping and integrating of various types of encrypted computations to work alongside garble circuit
operations. The overall process needed to be highly efficient so the response time to
users would be comparable to authenticating using typical password strings.
• UFace has a mobile application that is capable of efficient photo feature extraction,
compaction, and encryption while keeping each user’s computational burden to minimum. The development of the mobile application involved multiple challenges that
dealt with the limited memory/computing power of these mobile devices along with
the need to design a new library for facial feature generation tailored to work on
mobile device (or any device with limited power capabilities).

5
• UFace has been evaluated both theoretically and experimentally. The security analysis
shows that UFace is robust against various types of attacks. The experimental results
demonstrate that UFace not only can correctly authenticate a user, but also can be
done within seconds. This is significantly faster than any existing privacy preserving
authentication protocol to date.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related works
on privacy preserving face authentication and face recognition. Section 3 gives an overview
into the tools UFace utilizes while Section 4 provides an overview UFace’s phases. The
threat model and security goals of UFace are analyzed in Section 5. Then, Section 6
presents the UFace Android application at the user side and Section 7 presents the protocols
at server side. Section 8 provides a security analysis of the system and Section 9 reports the
performance study. Finally, Section 10 concludes the paper.
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2. RELATED WORKS

Biometric authentication is very convenient for end users since it reduces the number
of passwords to remember to zero. However, it also raises important privacy concerns since
users’ biometric data may be known by service providers or authentication servers [Bringer
et al., 2013]. One of the earliest attempts towards privacy preservation during biometric
authentication is by Erkin et al. [Erkin et al., 2009]. In their setup, the server has a set
of photos that it does not want the user to see while the user has his/her own photo that
needs to remain hidden from the server. They proposed a secure two-party comparison
protocol that allows each user to check if his/her photo matches a photo in the server’s
database using Eigenfaces while keeping both the user’s and the server’s photos private
to themselves. Later, Sadeghi et al. [Sadeghi et al., 2010] improved the efficiency of the
above protocol. Following the similar settings, Osadchy et al. [Osadchy et al., 2010] also
proposed a privacy-preserving face detection algorithm - SCiFI - that allows a user to check
if his/her photo is in the server’s database without knowing the server’s database. Huang et
al. [Evans et al., 2011] proposed a secure protocol for fingerprint matching while Blanton
et al. [Blanton and Gasti, 2011] proposed security protocols for both fingerprints and iris.
Recently, Sedenka et al. [Sedenka et al., 2015] employed a similar idea and implemented the
privacy-preserving face authentication on smart-phones. However, their system needs more
than 10 minutes for a single authentication which is not suitable for real-time applications.
Compared with the aforementioned works, UFace has a totally different setting. The
above works all assume that the authentication server has non-encrypted information, i.e.,
knows the unencrypted content of the each user’s biometric data. Unlike their works, the
authentication servers in UFace only have access to encrypted feature vectors representing
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facial images. This setting significantly enhances privacy preservation and also introduces
bigger challenges into the system design even though some of the same techniques are being
utilized: garbled circuits and Paillier encryption.
Recently, there are several works which have similar security goals by having only
encrypted data at the server side. One is by Blanton and Aliasgari who proposed both
a single-server and a multi-server secure protocol to outsource computations of matching
iris biometric data records. However, their single-server protocol uses predicate encryption
scheme [Katz et al., 2008, Shen et al., 2009] which is not as secure as the additive homomorphic encryption scheme adopted into UFace. Their multi-server protocol leverages
a secret sharing scheme [Shamir, 1979] and requires at least three independent servers,
whereas UFace only needs two independent servers and is much more efficient. In [Pal
et al., 2015], Pal et al. proposed to watermark each user’s facial image with fingerprints
and then encrypt the watermarked biometric data to protect its privacy from adversaries.
Their security protocol is conducted directly by the user and a single server, and hence the
user bears a heavy computation workload. In UFace, the computation at the user side is
lightweight, which helps conserve smart phone batteries. Another recent related work is
by Chun et al. [Chun et al., 2014] who developed a secure protocol that allows an organization to outsource encrypted users’ biometric data to the cloud and let the cloud conduct
authentication process on fully encrypted data. However, they mainly focus on fingerprint
matching, the computation of which is much simpler than that for the face recognition on
encrypted data within UFace. Also, their algorithm takes over an hour to authenticate a
user, which is not practical in a real world application.
In summary, there have been very limited efforts on privacy preserving face authentication and none of these existing work achieves the same security goal and efficiency as
the proposed UFace system.
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3. AUTHENTICATION TOOLS

To accomplish authentication between the UFace servers, a few different types of
tools are used: facial recognition and secure multiparty computations (SMCs). This section
gives an overview of each of these UFace operations to better understand the implementation
detailed in Section 7.

3.1. FACE RECOGNITION
Research on facial representation and recognition has been ongoing for numerous
years. Two of the earlier methods for representing a person’s face were Eigenfaces [Turk and
Pentland, 1991] and Fisherfaces [Belhumeur et al., 1997]. Recognition using eigenfaces
uses principal component analysis which essential takes a database of images and generates
something akin to factors of each face (known as eigenvalues). By assigning weights to
each of these eigenfaces, every user’s face in the database can be represented by a vector
of these weights combined with the associated eigenface. The vector of weights is known
as the feature vector. When a user wants to be recognized, first the new image is broken
into eigenfaces already designated by the server. Then a new feature vector is generated
based off the weights needed to best represent this image. Finally, the server and the user
just need to compare the feature vector of the new image against the feature vectors in the
database to find a match. Fisherfaces use a similar technique as eigenfaces, except instead
of using principal component analysis to generate factors, linear discriminant analysis is
used. The problem with these 2 facial recognition tools is that each is sensitive to change
in lighting and if more users are added to the database then the eigenfaces/fisherfaces need
to be updated.
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Later, a more advanced approach was proposed using local binary patterns (LBP)
[Ahonen et al., 2004] to generate a feature vector from a photo. Face recognition algorithms
using LBP patterns yield a higher accuracy rate under different environments (e.g., different
lighting). Another great aspect of LBP is that each user’s generated feature vector is not
based on any other user’s information in the database. Thus, if the database grows, a single
user maintains the same feature vector. In UFace, there can be any number of different
users for every registered web service and updating each user’s feature vector upon every
new registration would be time consuming and inefficient. Therefore, the LBP algorithm is
employed in this work as the foundation of the proposed encrypted face recognition.
The original LBP method follows a straightforward algorithm of picking an individual pixel and comparing its intensity against the 8 surrounding pixels’ intensity (intensity
is used since every image is first converted to gray-scale). If a surrounding pixel’s intensity
was greater than or equal to the intensity of the center pixel then it would be represented by
a 1, otherwise it was given a 0. Thus, each of the 8 surrounding pixels are given a single
bit of information so the collection of these pixels is a byte which is called a “label” in LBP
terms. This label is generated from starting at the pixel above and to the left of the center
pixel and then reading each bit in a counter-clockwise pattern.
An example of the basic LBP operation is shown in Figure 3.1. In this example, the
center pixel with an intensity value of 92 is the chosen pixel. This pixel is then compared
to the surrounding pixels with the function:


 0 if pi < pc

f (pi, pc ) =

 1 if pi ≥ pc


(3.1)

For the above equation, pi is the intensity of one of the eight surrounding pixels and
pc is the intensity of the center pixel. The result of of this operation is the encoding on the
right hand side of Figure 3.1. After the function has been performed, the generated label for
the pixel is obtained by concatenating the 8 bits around the center pixel in a clockwise order
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Figure 3.1. An example of computing the LBP for a pixel

starting from the top left pixel. The label encoding for the center pixel with an intensity
value of 92 in Figure 3.1 is 01010000. This process is repeated for every pixel in the image.
For neighboring pixels that do not exist, such as when the examine pixel is on the edge of
the image, bi-linear interpolation can be used to generate values for the imaginary pixels.
Once all the LBP labels have been generated, a histogram is generated using the
labels for the individual bins of the histogram. The value for each bin of the histogram is
the number occurrences of the specific encoding in the facial image. Since there are 8 bits
used to encode a single pixel, there are 28 = 256 possible labels. This means the histogram
will be a vector of length 256; however, this can be reduced by using something called
uniform labels. A label is considered uniform if there are at most two bit-wise transitions in
the encoding (ie. a change from 0 to 1 or vice versa). For an example, the label 01010000
in Figure 3.1 would not be uniform since there are 4 transitions while 00111000 would
be uniform since there are only 2 transitions. All non-uniform labels can be placed into a
single separate bin. Thus, since there are 58 uniform values between 0 and 28 and 1 bin for
all non-uniform values. The length of the histogram is then reduced to only needing n = 59
bins.
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The reason for uniform labels is that some labels occur more frequently than others
in an image [Ojala et al., 2002]. For a basic LBP pattern scheme, these uniform labels
account for slightly less than 90% of all labels in the image. This means that most pictures
can be described by using just these uniform patterns. This is especially true for facial
images because there is a gradual change between 2 close pixels; it’s much more probable
that if 1 pixel’s intensity is larger than the center pixel, then the other 2 surrounding pixels
will also be larger. In other words, the label for Figure 3.1 is unlikely to occur for pictures
of faces.
Now that it’s simple enough to create feature vectors from facial images, the next step
is to compare them for authentication purposes. To compare two feature vectors of faces,
standard histogram comparison techniques can be used such as Histogram Intersection.
Given two histograms A and B with n bins, the intersection is defined as:
n
Õ

min(Ai, Bi )

(3.2)

i=1

The problem is that this formula doesn’t provide any percentage on how closely the
2 histograms match. However, this formula can be normalized to by dividing this solution
by the number bins in each histogram:

H(A, B) =

i=1 min(Ai, Bi )
Ín
i=1 Bi

Ín

(3.3)

Now H(A, B) is a percentage showing the closeness of the histograms. This value
can then be compared to a threshold value to check if the 2 histograms are related enough
to be considered a match.
However, the current LBP scheme doesn’t maintain spatial relation of each image.
This can be seen from the fact that the label of a pixel at the top left corner of one image
can be equivalent to the label at the bottom right corner of a second image. This basic
algorithm can be easily expanded upon to maintain spatial information about the image -
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divide the image into separate regions and calculate the histogram for each section. This
allows for more efficient label comparison since a label found in the top left corner of the
image will have a smaller subset of pixels it can possibly match with.
The closeness of 2 histograms can easily be converted to be used with multiple
sections with the following modification:
Ík
H(A, B) =

j=1

i=1 min(A ji, B ji )
Ín
j=1 i=1 B ji

Ín

Ík

(3.4)

In the above equation, j is the region index for the section of the grid and i is the
bin index. It should be noted that if histograms are concatenated together, they behave like
a single giant histogram for the purposes of histogram intersection. A complete example
follows which will be used throughout the length of the paper.
If an image is N = 256 × 256 = 65, 536 pixels is separated into k = 16 sections (a
grid of size 2 × 2), then each section of the image will contain 128 × 128 = 16, 384 pixels
(since each grid section of the grid is 64 × 64 pixels). LBP is then done in each of the 4
sections to obtain 4 different histograms. These histograms are then concatenated together
in the form {H1 H2 . . . Hk } to form the feature vector of the face. Since the number of bins n - is 59, the large histogram will contain k × n = 4 × 59 = 236 bins. It should also be noted
that the max value in any bin is equal to the number of pixels in a section. The equation
below shows how to calculate the number of bits needed per bin:

bitsbin = log2

N
+1
k

(3.5)

In the previous equation, bitsbin is the number of bits needed per bin, N is the total
number of pixels in the image and k is the number of sections the image was broken into.
Since there are 4,096 pixels in each section, the max value in any bin is 4,096 which means
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the number of bits needed to represent each bin value is (at most) log2 (16, 384) + 1 = 15.
Thus, the entire feature vector can be represented by just 236 × 15 = 3, 540 bits or 0.4321
kB of information.

3.2. SECURE MULTIPARTY COMPUTATION TOOLS
In this paper, privacy/security is closely related to the amount of information disclosed during the execution of a protocol. There are many ways to define information
disclosure. To maximize privacy or minimize information disclosure, this paper adopts the
security definitions in the literature of SMC first introduced by Yao’s millionaire problem
for which a provably secure solution was developed [Yao, 1982, 1986]. This was extended
to multiparty computations by Goldreich et al. [Goldreich et al., 1987]. It was proved in
[Goldreich et al., 1987] that any computation which can be done in polynomial time by a
single party can also be done securely by multiple parties. Since then much work has been
published for the multiparty case [Canetti, 2000, Ben-David et al., 2008, Katz and Lindell,
2007, Goldreich, 2004]. However, in this paper, security is restricted to the two-party case.
There are two common adversarial models under SMC: semi-honest and malicious.
An adversarial model generally specifies what an adversary or attacker is allowed to do
during an execution for a security protocol. In the semi-honest model, an attacker (i.e.,
one of the participating parties) is expected to follow the prescribed steps of a protocol.
However, the attacker can compute any additional information based on his or her private
input, output and messages received during an execution of a secure protocol. As a result,
whatever can be inferred from the private input and output of an attacker is not considered
as a privacy violation. An adversary in the semi-honest model can be treated as a passive
attacker; on the other hand, an adversary in the malicious model can be treated as an active
attacker who can arbitrarily diverge from the normal execution of a protocol.
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UFace’s proposed protocols are secure under the SMC definition, and construction
of these protocols are based on two secure primitives: garbled circuit and additive homomorphic encryption. Garbled circuit is a generic tool to securely implement any two-party
polynomially-bounded distributed functionality [Huang et al., 2011] based on the fact that
the functionality can be represented by a Boolean circuit which can be evaluated securely. In
addition, UFace adopt the Paillier cryptosystem, an additive homomorphic and probabilistic asymmetric encryption scheme [Paillier, 1999]. The encryption scheme is semantically
secure [Goldwasser and Micali, 1984], i.e., given a set of ciphertexts, an adversary cannot
deduce any information about the plaintext. The following sections will go over each tool
in more detail.
3.2.1. Garbled Circuits. The goal of garbled circuits is to provide a secure computation for multiple parties to compute a function in which no party learns the inputs of
any single party. For a two party computation, the party that generates the circuits encodes
their own inputs into the function that needs to be computed. This creates a function that
instead of needing 2 inputs from each party, only needs the input from the other party. The
next step is to generate a circuit based off this new function.
A circuit can be considered a sequence of boolean gates which are able to compute
the function that needs to be computed. Once the circuit is generated, the next step is to
obfuscate the inputs with 2 random keys for each wire of the circuit. These 2 keys (Ki0 and
Ki1 ) correspond to wire i being assigned either a 0 or 1. This “garbled circuit” is then sent
to the other party where the remaining calculations are computed.
At this point, the second party has the garbled circuit, but no way of computing the
function since his/her own inputs are missing. These inputs are obtained through oblivious
transfer from the first party. The circuit is then evaluated securely. Since each wire is
obfuscated with 2 random keys, the party calculating the garbled circuit cannot determine
the inputs of the other party based on the output.
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At no point are either party’s inputs leaked to any other party. Obtained from the
garbled circuit is the proper solution to the function that is evaluated. For more thorough
details on garbled circuits, see [Yao, 1986].
3.2.2. Paillier Cryptosystem. This type of cryptosystem is known as an additive
homomorphic public-key encryption scheme. In public-key cryptosystems, a public key is
used to encrypt a piece of information; however, to decrypt the ciphertext, a second (private)
key is needed. In this setting, an authenticator generates both keys and distributes the public
key while keeping the private key secure. Then, when a message needs to be sent to the
authenticator, it’s first encrypted using the public key and then decrypted once it reaches
the destination. The only person capable of decrypting the ciphertext is the authenticator
with the private key. A great aspect about public-key schemes is that if an attacker obtains
the encrypted version of the message, then he/she will not be able to deduce anything about
the actual message since the attacker doesn’t have a way of decrypting the information.
Another great aspect is that this allows one authenticator to talk with many different parties
without generating multiple keys between each party - the one decryption key can decrypt
any message sent from any party.
However, public-key cryptosystems are not perfect and can be subject to attack. One
example is that if an attacker can obtain a ciphertext, then he/she can determine the plaintext
information by taking all possible encryptions of every message in the domain space until an
encryption matches the ciphertext. If the domain space is small enough, then this could take
a short amount of time. So a way of fixing that is to ensure that the ciphertext is semantically
secure, which is something Paillier’s cryptosystem does. Being semantically secure means
that any ciphertext will reveal nothing about the original message. To ensure that the
system is semantically secure, each encryption needs to map to a separate ciphertext (even
2 encryptions of the same message). In Paillier’s cryptosystem, this is done by introducing
a random value during the encryption of a message.
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The second aspect of this cryptosystem is that it is additively homorphic. This means
that it’s possible to compute the encrypted sum of encrypted messages (E(m1 ) · E(m2 ) ≡
E(m1 + m2 )) and the encrypted multiplication of encrypted messages (E(m) k ≡ E(k × m)).
Essentially, it allows for operations to be done on a message without needing to decrypt a
message first, which is utilized in the operation of UFace’s garbled circuit protocol. For
more thorough details on Paillier’s encryption scheme, see [Paillier, 1999].
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4. SYSTEM OVERVIEW

UFace is designed as a privacy preserving face authentication framework to prevent
web service providers from gaining access to user’s facial images or their respective feature
vectors. To accomplish this, UFace serves as the middle man between multiple web service
providers and users. As shown in Figure 1.1, there are 4 entities involved in the system: (1)
end users, (2) web service providers, (3) UFace data servers, and (4) UFace key servers. The
UFace data servers store all users’ encrypted feature vectors while the UFace key servers
manages the key capable of decrypting this information. However, the 2 server clouds never
collude about their contents and execute a secure multiparty computation to authenticate
users. This design follows the spirit of “separation of duty” to achieve privacy preservation.
For the remainder of the paper, each UFace server cloud will be considered to be 1 single
server for easy illustration of the main ideas. UFace is comprised of 2 main phases of
operation: (1) Registration and (2) Authentication.
Before going any further, it should be stressed that all data stored on the UFace
data server is encrypted using Paillier’s cryptosystem. This data is the encryption of a
feature vector representation of the user’s face (not the encrypted version of an image). The
encryption is done before being transmitted on a secure line. The data is therefore as secure
as Paillier’s cryptosystem. Secondly, the security of each of the UFace servers (data and key
server) should be using state of the art security measures so attackers cannot easily break
into the systems. This paper’s focus is not on the security of the servers, but instead focuses
on the security of the protocol to compare encrypted feature vectors.
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4.1. REGISTRATION
To register with a web service, a user just needs to install the UFace mobile client.
The user will select a web service that is already registered with UFace and create a unique
User I D for the web service. To finish registration, the user only needs to take a close-up
photo of their face. After the user takes a photo, the app executes the LBP algorithm to
generate a feature vector on the photo and then encrypts the feature vector before sending
this information off to the UFace data server for authentication. This is all done in the
background and happens immediately after the user takes a photo. The UFace data server
receives the encrypted data and stores the information at a specific location - IndexI D for that user (which is shared with the web service provider and the user). At this point,
the user is registered with the web service and the data server contains an encrypted feature
vector for the user to compare against for authentication.

4.2. AUTHENTICATION
To begin authentication for a web service, the user only needs to select the registered
web service and take a close-up image of the user’s face. While this is occurring, the app
will send the User I D to the web service so the service knows a specific user is attempting
to log into their system. The web service will then forward the associated IndexI D to the
UFace data server so the data server knows that an authentication attempt will begin for
the specified user. Meanwhile, the mobile app has executed the LBP algorithm, generated
a feature vector from the taken photo and encrypted this feature vector (same as in the
registration phase). Finally, once a message is received from the web service stating that
authentication may begin, the app sends the encrypted feature vector and its IndexI D to
the UFace data server. The application does not send the User I D so that the UFace data
server can’t map any encrypted feature vectors directly to a user. Instead, there is a layer of
obscurity to who the user is since it’s just a number which only the user and web service
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can reference. Also, the IndexI D the user contains is first verified with the IndexI D the
web service contains, if these IDs are different then the UFace data server won’t execute the
authentication protocol since it would be waiting on a different IndexI D. Once the data
is successfully sent to the UFace data server, both the data and key servers collaboratively
conduct a secure protocol to determine the comparison result between the sent encrypted
feature vector and the one stored on the UFace data server at the location determined by the
IndexI D. The secure protocol ensures that each server’s information remains confidential
to each server, so even though the UFace key server has the key to decrypt all messages, it
never obtains information about the user’s biometric data nor does the UFace data server
ever get the decryption key. The result is then sent to the web service which then forwards
the response to the user. Figure 1.1 provides an outline for how authentication works within
the UFace system (numbers show order of information travel).
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5. THREAT MODEL AND SECURITY GOALS

In UFace system, the commonly used semi-honest security model is adopted which
assumes that each participating party will follow the protocol but may try to learn additional
information by exploring the information available to them [Goldreich, 2004]. In general,
secure protocols under the semi-honest model are more efficient than those under the
malicious adversary model, and almost all practical SMC protocols proposed in the literature
[Canetti, 2000, Ben-David et al., 2008, Katz and Lindell, 2007, Goldreich, 2004] are secure
under the semi-honest model. In this model, the participating parties will not collude, these
parties are the UFace data and key servers. This can be guaranteed by deploying the two
servers in two different clouds such as Amazon and Microsoft whereby the two big cloud
service providers have no incentive to collude.
The security goal of UFace is to keep users’ authentication information fully private,
which includes the following aspects:
• Users do not need to reveal the actual content of their facial images or plaintext feature
vectors to any party during the authentication process.
• Web service providers can safely outsource the authentication process to UFace
without violating users’ privacy concerns regarding their biometric data that have
been used for authentication.
• UFace authentication servers perform authentication on encrypted randomized data.
• UFace authentication servers can not connect any encrypted information back to any
specific user.
In the following sections, the UFace application at the client side and the privacy
preserving protocols at the server side will be presented, respectively. Afterwards, specific
security issues vulnerabilities will be examined in Section 8.
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6. UFACE MOBILE APPLICATION

The UFace Android application consists of two modules: Web Service Access
and UFacePass Generation. The first refers to the 2 phases of UFace: registration and
authentication. The second module explains how the encrypted feature vector is generated.
Each will be discussed in the following sections.

6.1. WEB SERVICE ACCESS
To start logging into a web service securely, users only need to register with a web
service provider. Upon start-up, the app retrieves a public key (PK) used for encryption
and displays a blank screen with a “+” icon as shown in Figure 6.1a. The reason PK is
downloaded every time the app starts is for 2 reasons: (1) so the user always has the correct
encryption key in case the cryptographic scheme changes and (2) as a check to make sure
the user can communicate with the UFace system.
By clicking on the “+" icon, a new window will display a list of web services which
use the UFace system for authentication (obtained from the UFace data server automatically
upon screen initialization) - seen in Figure 6.1b. Once the user selects a web service, the
user will see a registration page to create a unique “User I D” for the web service. The
User I D will be sent to the web service provider to verify the uniqueness (as shown in
Figure 6.1c). If the User I D is unique, the web service provider will return an “IndexI D"
to the user. This IndexI D was generated from the UFace data server to indicate the location
where the user’s encrypted feature vector (“UFacePass”) will be stored. The IndexI D also
prevents the data server from knowing the user’s actual User I D which prevents the UFace
system from knowing exactly whose each UFacePass belongs to. By creating different
IndexI Ds, it would be easy to extend the current system to accommodate multiple user
devices registered for the same web service.
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Finally, the user just needs to take a close-up facial photo to finish registration. This
photo needs to be taken extremely close up so that the entire face takes up most of the space
in the photo. The further the photo is taken from the user’s face the greater risk the user is
to specific attacks (see 8.2 under “impersonation attack” for more information). The photo
is used to generate the UFacePass (the algorithm is presented in Section 6.2) and it’s sent
to the UFace data server along with the IndexI D. The User I D, IndexI D, and web service
information are stored in the app if registration is successful.
After successful registration, the main page of the app will now show a list of
icons representing registered web services as shown in Figure 6.1d. After selecting a web
service, the user will be required to take a close-up facial photo (Figure 6.1e) to generate
a new UFacePass. The app will send the User I D to the web service provider to begin
authentication. After the web service receives notification from the UFace data server, it
will then respond to the user by saying a new authentication attempt may begin. The app
will then send the UFacePass and the IndexI D to the UFace data server for authentication.
After UFace executes the authentication protocol, the result will then be send to the web
service and forwarded to the client (there is no response from the UFace system directly).
If access is granted, the user will be directed to the account for that web service (which
Figure 6.1f shows a successful authentication attempt).

6.2. UFACEPASS GENERATION
The most important feature of the UFace Android app is the UFacePass generator.
This converts the user’s close-up photo into an encrypted feature vector efficiently. The
overall process can be seen in Figure 6.2. However, there are 3 main steps to creating the
UFacePass: (1) feature vector generation, (2) feature vector manipulation and (2) feature
vector encryption.
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(a) Home Screen

(b) Service List

(c) Registration Page

(d) Registration Result (e) Authentication Page (f) Authentication Result

Figure 6.1. Snapshots of the UFace mobile application

6.2.1. Feature Vector Generation. When the user is asked to take a facial image,
the image needs to be a close-up photo that fills the whole screen of the smartphone. Every
phone takes different quality pictures, thus the image needs to go through a small preprocessing phase to create images that can be used in the algorithm. The only requirement
is that every image needs to contain the same number of pixels, so the image will be shrunk
down if the picture is too large and it will fail if the image is too small. The size of the image
was determined in the experimental section of this paper (Section 9) based on the speed

24

Figure 6.2. UPass generation

needed to accomplish authentication in real-time and for making sure the authentication
was accurate in its results. The best pixel count was determined to be N = 65, 536 which
refers to a square image of size 256 × 256 pixels. It should be noted that camera’s on today’s
cellphones are measured in Megapixels; thus, it’ll be incredibly difficult to find a camera
today unable to take a picture containing at least 65,536 pixels.
Once the image is captured and properly sized, the LBP algorithm is executed to
create a feature vector. As introduced in Section 3.1, a LBP photo feature vector can be
represented in the form given by Definition 1.
Definition 1 (Feature Vector) Let p be a photo. Its feature vector Fp is represented as
−
→
−→
→
−
Fp = hH1, . . . , Hk i, where Hi = hb1, . . . , b59 i (1 ≤ i ≤ k).
First, the image is divided into equal sections. The number of sections was determined to be k = 16 in the experimental section of this paper to optimize speed and
correctness (Section 9). In each of these k sections, the LBP algorithm is executed to obtain
a histogram - Hk . This histogram is the count of 59 labels: 58 uniform labels and 1 label
for all other values (see Section 3.1).
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The full feature vector is simply the concatenation of these k histograms. In the end
−
→
−→
the feature vector Fp is hH1, . . . , Hk i. Now that the feature vector is created, it needs to be
encrypted in such a way that the time taken does not negatively impact the ability for this
application to run in real-time.
6.2.2. Feature Vector Manipulation. To speed up encryption time, the feature
vector needs to be manipulated. Let’s first examine the theoretical case that was first
presented in Section 3.1. It should be noted that all the values presented are the values
used in the final application; the reasons for each of these values are determined in the
experimental section (Section 9).
For an image of size N = 256 × 256 = 65, 536 pixels broken into k = 4 sections,
the number of bins that need to be encrypted is b = 4 × 59 = 236. Another fact is that the
max pixel count in each section would be d 65,536
4 e = 16, 384 pixels. Thus, the max number
of bits needed to represent any individual bin in the feature vector (and more specifically
each section) is b = log2 16, 384 + 1 = 15 bits. The final piece of information is the number
of bits needed to do a single encryption. Paillier encryption in UFace uses 1,024 bits to
encrypt each bin, which means that if each bin is encrypted separately, there would be
1, 024 − 15 = 1, 009 bits of wasted information with every encryption. The total size of the
feature vector would be 236 × 1, 024 = 241, 664 bits or 29.5 kB with 236 × 1, 009 = 238, 124
wasted bits which is roughly 29.0679 kB.
To improve this, sequential bin values will be concatenated together into 1 single
value which is then encrypted. This would mean that b 1,024
15 c = 68 bins can be used in
1 encryption with just 1024 modulo 15 = 4 extra bits instead of 1,009 bits for every 68
bins. Instead of 236 encryptions with 29.5 KB of data being sent, there is only d 236
78 e = 4
encryptions with 4 × 1, 024 = 4, 816 bits or 0.5879 KB. The amount of wasted space is just
4 × 4 = 16 bits or 0.0020 kB. This new size is roughly 2% of the original size.
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UFace’s process of reducing the size is done through 2 different algorithms. The
first converts the integer matrix of size 4 × 59, which was generated by LBP, into an integer
matrix of size 4 × 68, which is the 4 encryptions of the 68 sequential integer values. This
algorithm can be seen in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Split Feature Vector for Encryption
Require: numEnc be the number of encryptions needed
Require: numBins be the number of bins that can be concatenated together per encryption
Require: n be the number of bins per section of grid
Require: k be the number of sections in the grid
Require: hist[k][n] be the input histogram
Require: splitFV be the returned array
1: splitFV ← int[numEnc][numBins]
2: in ← 0
3: out ← 0
4: for i ∈ {1, . . . , numEnc} do
5:
for k ∈ {1, . . . , numBins} do
6:
splitFV[i][k] ← hist[out][in]
7:
in ← in + 1
8:
if in = n then
9:
out ← out + 1
10:
in ← 0
11:
if out = k then
12:
return splitFV
13:
end if
14:
end if
15:
end for
16: end for
The second algorithm takes this intermediate matrix and converts it to a byte matrix
of size 4 × 128. The 128 is in reference to the number of bytes that can be encrypted at once
(ie. 128 × 8 = 1024 - which is the size used in this Paillier cryptosystem). The process can
be seen in Algorithm 2, but overall it takes the 68 sequential integer values and breaks them
into their corresponding bit value. These bits are then concatenated into sequences of 8 to
be placed into the matrix of bytes. The first 4 bits of each of the 4 byte arrays are set to 0
since they are wasted space for each encryption. Figure 6.3 visually shows how each array
of integers becomes an array of bytes.

27
Algorithm 2 Create Byte Feature Vector
Require: numBytes be the number of bytes used per encryption
Require: numW aste be the number of wasted bits per encryption
Require: numBits be the number of bits used to represent each value in any bin
Require: numEnc be the number of encryptions needed
Require: numBins be the number of bins that can be concatenated together per encryption
Require: n be the number of bins per section of grid
Require: k be the number of sections in the grid
Require: splitFV[numEnc][numBins] be the input histogram
Require: byteFV be the returned array
1: byteFV ← byte[numEnc][numBytes]
2: for i ∈ {1, . . . , numEnc} do
3:
int Array ← splitFV[i]
4:
le f t ZeroBits ← numW aste
5:
next ← 0x00
6:
index ← 0
7:
bitsUsed ← 0
8:
for k ∈ {1, . . . , length(int Array)} do
9:
bitsNeeded ← numBits
10:
curV al ← int Array[k]
11:
while bitsNeeded > 0 do
12:
if le f t ZeroBits >= 8 then
13:
byteFV[i][index + +] ← next
14:
next ← 0x00
15:
le f t ZeroBits ← le f t ZeroBits − 8
16:
else
17:
if bitsNeeded >= (8 − le f t ZeroBits − bitsUsed) then
18:
shi f t Right ← bitsNeeded + le f t ZeroBits + bitsUsed − 8
19:
next ← ((curV al >>> shi f t Right)&0xFF)|next
20:
bitsNeeded ← bitsNeeded − (8 − le f t ZeroBits − bitsUsed)
21:
bitsUsed ← 0
22:
byteFV[i][index + +] ← next
23:
next ← 0x00
24:
le f t ZeroBytes ← 0
25:
else
26:
shi f t Le f t ← 8 − bitsNeeded
27:
next ← ((curV al << shi f t Le f t)&0xFF)|next
28:
bitsUsed ← bitsNeeded
29:
bitsNeeded ← 0
30:
end if
31:
end if
32:
end while
33:
end for
34: end for
35: return byteFV
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Figure 6.3. Feature vector compaction

Finally, these 4 byte arrays are then converted to a single array of 4 BigInteger values.
These BigInteger values are what is encrypted with Paillier’s cryptosystem to become the
UFacePass.
6.2.3. Feature Vector Encryption. At this point, a reduced feature vector is obtained which just needs to be encrypted. The encryption algorithm simply iterates through
each of the 4 BigInteger values and encrypts each one using the public key obtained from
the UFace key server for Paillier’s cryptosystem (see Section 3.2.2). Once the feature vector is fully encrypted, it and the IndexI D are sent off to the UFace data server for either
registration or authentication. From this point on, the client is done with any calculation
and is now just awaiting a response from the web service.
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7. UFACE SERVER

UFace system utilizes a data server and a key server for authentication, which are
located in two different clouds to avoid potential collusion. The data server is used for
storing the encrypted UFacePass for each user, i.e., the encrypted feature vector. Each
UFacePass is stored at a specific index which can be referenced by each user’s IndexI D;
however, the data server does not know anything about a specific user nor any user’s
User I D. The key server is used for maintaining the public key (PK) that can decrypt a
user’s UFacePass. In what follows, the registration and authentication phases, respectively,
are presented.

7.1. REGISTRATION
The registration phase is fast since there is no need for computation on the server
side. Figure 7.1 illustrates the main communication between all parties during registration
- note that all communications are through secure channels. Before registration begins, the
UFace key server transfers PK to the user (this is done every single time the application
starts). Then the user (i.e., the UFace mobile application) sends a new User I D to the web
service provider. Once the web service provider verifies the uniqueness of the User I D
it informs the UFace data server to prepare an IndexI D for a new user. The UFace data
server will send the IndexI D back to the web service provider which will forward it to
the user. While this is happening, the user is taking a close up facial photo. The mobile
application then generates a feature vector from the LBP algorithm, manipulates the data
for better encryption, and then encrypts the feature vector using PK to obtain UFacePass.
Upon receiving the IndexI D (and after generating UFacePass), the user will then send
the IndexI D and UFacePass to the data server. The mobile application will also store the
IndexI D and User I D for the specific web service so the user does not need to remember
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Figure 7.1. Registration protocol

anything. The data server will store the received user information at the location provided
from the IndexI D and inform the web service of a successful registration which then
informs the user. The data server never sees the user’s real User I D and the UFacePass is
encrypted with the key stored on the UFace key server so it cannot decrypt the information.

7.2. PRIVACY-PRESERVING AUTHENTICATION
After registration, an user can log into the web service by simply selecting the web
service on the mobile app and taking a close-up facial image; this offers a similar user
experience to typical web service authentication pages - except with no need to remember a password. Again, all communication is conducted through secure channels. The
authentication protocol is outlined in Figure 7.2.
First, the user (i.e., UFace app) obtains PK from the UFace key server. Then
the user sends the User I D and IndexI D to the web service provider who will locate the
IndexI D of this user compare the sent ID with the stored one. If the IDs match, then the
web service will forward it to the UFace data server to establish an authentication request.
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Figure 7.2. Authentication protocol

Then, the user will send his IndexI D and a newly generated UFacePass to the data
server. Upon receiving the user’s authentication information, the data server will initiate
a privacy-preserving authentication protocol with the UFace key server to jointly compare
the received UFacePass with the user’s registered UFacePass. The proposed privacy
preserving authentication protocol is built with garbled circuits, and ensures that neither the
data server nor the key server will see the user’s biometric information. The details of the
privacy-preserving authentication protocol is presented in the next section (Section 7.2).
At the end of the privacy-preserving authentication protocol, the data server will
return the result to the web service provider. If the result is a match, then the user’s
UFacePass matches the registered stored information over a specific threshold. The
threshold value was determined experimentally to be 92.78% similar; the reasoning can be
seen in Section 9. Based on the result, the web service provider will grant/deny access to
the user accordingly.
Now it’s time to describe the privacy-preserving authentication protocol between
the data server and the key server. This protocol leverages the garbled circuit techniques
[Huang et al., 2011] because garbled circuits have been proven to be efficient for small
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functionality represented by a boolean circuit and efficiency is a key requirement to achieve
real-time authentication. In the following discussion, the two encrypted feature vectors are
denoted as E(F1 ) and E(F2 ), whereby E(F1 ) refers to the feature vector that has been stored
with the data server at the registration phase and E(F2 ) refers to the feature vector received
with the authentication request. F1 refers to the unencrypted version of the feature vector
stored on the data server while F2 refers to the enencrypted version of the feature vector
send to the data server for authentication. It should be noted that neither F1 nor F2 are
ever able to be viewed by any party participating in the authentication protocol (UFace data
server or key server). Table 7.1 summarizes the notations used in the discussion.
Table 7.1. Notations
F1
F2
E(F1 )
E(F2 )
R1
R2
F1R
F2R

Feature vector 1
Feature vector 2
Encrypted feature vector 1
Encrypted feature vector 2
Value used to randomize F1
Value used to randomize F2
Randomized F1
Randomized F2

The design challenge is that garbled circuits can only handle plain text efficiently,
but the feature vectors are all encrypted. In order to preserve efficiency, decrypted data
needs to be fed into the garbled circuits. If the encrypted feature vector are sent directly
to the key server for decryption, the key server will then know the user’s feature vector
information and hence violate the privacy preservation goal. To prevent this, the data
server add random values R1 and R2 to feature vectors E(F1 ) and E(F2 ) respectively using
the Paillier cryptosystem’s additive homomorphic property, and then send the randomized
feature vectors to the key server. Now the key server can decrypt the randomized feature
vectors without learning about the user’s information. These decrypted randomized feature
vectors are the main input to the garbled circuit. The comparison results of the pair of
randomized feature vectors would be the same as the original pair since the random values
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R! and R2 will be removed from F1 and F2 within the garbled circuit. Thus, the garbled
circuit will end up just comparing F1 against F2 and this will still be able to tell whether F1
matches F2 .
Specifically, the data server sends the following information to the garbled circuit:
R1 , R2 , Rbit and T h, whereby Rbit is a single bit used to hide the circuits outcome from the
key server, and T h is an adjustable threshold value for face recognition accuracy. Then,
the key server feeds the decrypted randomized feature vectors F1R and F2R to the garbled
circuits. It is worth noting that at a high level view there are only these five inputs total,
but in practice, there are multiple. Since each input is limited to the same bit size as the
encryption key, multiple inputs are needed to represent each feature vector. For ease of
understanding, each feature vector will be considered as one input.
The main steps of using a garbled circuit to compare two encrypted feature vectors
are outlined in Algorithm 3. At steps 1 and 2, the random values are subtracted from the
randomized feature vectors. To speed up the process, the random values are inverted when
provided to the garbled circuit; this allows adding to be done instead of subtraction. The
result will overflow the value to have the effect of modular division since the overflow bit is
lost. This functions identically to subtraction, but faster. For clarity however, the random
values are stated as being subtracted.
Algorithm 3 GCParser Circuit Code
Require: Data_Server: R1 , R2 , Rbit , and T h; Key_Server: F1R and F2R
1: Subtract R1 from F1R
2: Subtract R2 from F2R
3: Now F1 and F2 are in the circuit
4: Each bin b1i of F1 is isolated
5: Each bin b2i of F2 is isolated
6: for i ← 1 to k × n do
7:
min x = min(b1i, b2i )
8: end for
Í k×n
9: inter section = x=1 min x
10: pass = inter section ≥ T h
11: result = pass ⊕ Rbit
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As a result of the first two steps, the circuit will have the original non-randomized,
decrypted feature vectors F1 and F2 . Conceptually each feature vector is a matrix. For
the garbled circuit, each feature vector is the individual bins b j,i (where j ∈ {1, 2} and
−v concatenated end to end. The value j represents 1
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n × k}) from each →
specific feature vector, k represents the number of sections an image is separated into
−v is the
while n is the number of bins for the histogram created in each section, and →
histogram generated for each section. Thus, each feature vector has the internal appearance
of b j,1 b j,2 b j,3 . . . b j,k×n . To further process these individual bins, the bins have to be
separated, which is the main purpose of this step. Since each bin has a known bit size, the
bins can be separated by linearly traversing the feature vector and isolating every block of
the bit size. Once each bin is isolated, the intersection calculations begin. As shown in
step 3 of the algorithm, by linearly walking through all the bins, the minimum between the
corresponding bins of each feature vector is calculated.
−v are calculated which is done
In the next step, the sum of the minimums from each →
in parallel to improve efficiency. These minimums are added together to obtain the final
sum. Based on the final sum of the two feature vectors F1 and F2 , the 2 feature vectors can
now be evaluated for similarity. To determine similarity, the final sum needs to be compared
against a threshold. For UFace, the threshold value is set to 0.9278 based on the results
obtained in Section 9, which means the 2 feature vectors need to be at least 92.78% similar.
The following explains the threshold checking. When calculating the local binary
patterns, a binary pattern (label) is generated for each pixel in the image. Thus, when
histogram intersection is performed between identical feature vectors, the resulting value
will simply be the total number of pixels in the image. If the requirement is a 92.78%
match for authentication, the threshold value T h can be set to 0.9278 × N where N is the
number of pixels. Inside the circuit resulting intersection can be compared to T h and if the
intersection is greater than or equal a 1 is returned, otherwise a 0 is returned. In this way,
the expensive secure division operation do not need to be performed.
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Finally, to prevent the key server from knowing the authentication result, the result
is XOR’ed with Rbit . What the key server will see is a single bit that has a 50% chance of
indicating “match" or “unmatch". The data server can perform the XOR operation on the
result to receive the actual result.
An overview of the protocol is given in Algorithm 4. When the protocol begins
execution on the server side, it is assumed that both servers have a copy of the garbled
circuit. The operations of the circuit do not change with each execution, so the circuit only
needs to be constructed upon initial server setup. However, when GCParser runs the circuit
file, the circuit will be uniquely garbled. Therefore, with each execution of the protocol, a
different garbled circuit is produced. Should either server attempt to change the circuit file,
GCParser will abort operations due to these differences.
It is also assumed that a threshold value T h has been set during the setup, and the
user has registered a feature vector on the system. After the client has submitted a feature
vector for comparison, the authentication protocol can begin. The following analysis is a
complete walk-through of Algorithm 4.
At step 1, the data server generates the random values R1 and R2 that are used to
randomized the feature vectors. Because the feature vectors will be represented by x number
of bins, R1 will also be represented by x number of random values; one random value for
each bin. For clarity, each feature vector and random number is referred to as a single entity.
To randomize the feature vectors, the random values must also be encrypted as seen in the
sub-steps. The encryption is performed using the public key generated by the key server,
which is the same key used to encrypt the feature vectors.
Once the random values are encrypted, the homomorphic additive property of
Paillier’s encryption scheme is used to add a feature vector and a random number by
multiplying the two encrypted values together. In preparation for the execution of the

36
garbled circuit, the data server also generates the random bit Rbit at step 1(c) and proceeds
to construct its input file. At the end of step 1, the feature vectors can safely be sent to the
key server.
At step 2, the key server’s operations begin upon receiving E(F1R ) and E(F2R ). At
step 2(a), these values are decrypted using the key server’s private key. Because the values
have been randomized, the key server never actually sees the original plaintext values. These
two values will be the only inputs that the key server provides to the garbled circuit and as
such directly writes the values to its circuit input file. At the end of step 2, the key server
starts the server component of GCParser using the circuit file and its circuit input file. What
is not shown in Algorithm 4 is that the key server will send a message to the data server
telling it that GCParser has been started. This just ensures the proper ordering of steps as
displayed in the algorithm.
When the data server begins execution of the garbled circuit at step 3, it executes
GCParser as a client that connects the server instance running on the key server. It must
provide as input the IP address of the key server, its input file, and a copy of the circuit.
As mentioned earlier if the circuit file is different from the one used by the key server, the
operation will fail.
At step 4, both servers collaboratively run the GCParser which handles the computations obliviously or securely, so even though the key server is running the garbled circuit,
it never sees the plaintext version of the data server’s input. After the secure evaluation
of the circuit, GCParser will write the circuit output to a file on both servers. These files
contain a result that is a randomized bit. For a more in depth view of the circuit, refer to
Section 7.2.
With the final result returned from the garbled circuit, the data server performs an
XOR operation between the circuit result and Rbit . This will undo the XOR operation that
was performed within the garbled circuit and provide the result of the threshold comparison.
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If this value is 1, then the intersection was greater than the threshold, and is zero otherwise.
At this point, authentication has been performed, and the data server can communicate with
the user about the results.
Algorithm 4 Overall Protocol Between Authentication Servers
Require: Data_Server: E(F1 ), E(F2 ) and T h
1: Data_Server:
(a) Randomly generate R1 and R2 , and encrypt them to produce E(R1 ) and E(R2 )
(b) Calculate E(F1R ) = E(F1 + R1 ) = E(F1 ) ∗ E(R1 ) and E(F2R ) = E(F2 + R2 ) =
E(F2 ) ∗ E(R2 )
(c) Generate a random bit Rbit and produce a garbled circuit input file using R1 , R2 ,
T h, and Rbit
(d) Send E(F1R ) and E(F2R ) to Key_Server
2:

Key_Server:
(a) Decrypt E(F1R ) and E(F1R ) and write the values to a garbled circuit input file
(b) Start GCParser as server using its input file and the circuit

3:

Data_Server:
(a) Use GCParser to connect to the circuit running on Key_Server as a client using its
input file

4:

Data_Server and Key_Server:
(a) Using GCParser, collaboratively evaluate the garbled circuit, and the evaluation
result returns to both parties

5:

Data_Server:
(a) Perform XOR operation with the result and Rbit
(b) Inform the authentication result to the web service: If the XOR result is a 1,
authentication passed, else it failed
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8. SECURITY ANALYSIS

UFace does not leak any user’s biometric information to the data server, the key
server or the web service provider. This is because our approach follows the security
definitions in the literature of SMC. As a result, our proposed protocol can be easily
proved to be secure under the semi-honest model of SMC by using the simulation argument
[Goldreich, 2004].

8.1. SECURITY PROOF
In our work, privacy/security is determined by the amount of information disclosed
during the execution of the authentication protocol. Our approach follows the security
definitions in the literature of SMC [Yao, 1982, 1986, Goldreich et al., 1987, Canetti, 2000,
Ben-David et al., 2008, Katz and Lindell, 2007, Goldreich, 2004]. As a result, our proposed
protocol can be easily proved to be secure under the semi-honest model of SMC by using
the simulation argument [Goldreich, 2004] as follows.
be i’s execution image of the protocol π
Î
and s be the result computed from π. π is secure if i (π) can be simulated from hTi, si and
Î
distribution of the simulated image is computationally indistinguishable from i (π).

Definition 2 Let Ti be the input of party i,

Î

i (π)

In the above definition, an execution image generally includes the input, the output
and the messages communicated during an execution of the protocol. By showing that the
execution image of a protocol does not leak any information regarding the private inputs of
participating parties, the protocol can be proved to be secure [Goldreich, 2004]. In our case,
the execution image for the data server mainly includes the two encrypted feature vectors.
As mentioned earlier, since the data server does not have the private/decryption key and the
encryption scheme is semantically secure, the image is computationally indistinguishable
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from a random sequence. Therefore, no information regarding the user’s private data is
leaked to the data server before executing the garbled circuit. Similar argument applies to
the key server because the information that it received is randomized. In addition, all the
intermediate results are either encrypted or randomized, and the garbled circuit approach
is secure under the semi-honest model. As a result, based on the composition theorem
[Goldreich, 2004], the overall protocol (Algorithm 4) is secure under the semi-honest
model, i.e., any information regarding any users’ private data is never leaked during the
execution of our proposed protocol.

8.2. ATTACK ANALYSIS
8.2.1. Impersonation Attack. This is the most concerning attack in face authentication whereby the attacker tries to use the user’s photo to gain access to the user’s web
accounts [Duc and Minh, 2009]. To perform such attacks on our UFace system, the attacker
needs to have the targeted user’s User I D and the user’s close up facial image. The user and
the web service are the only 2 parties that know the user’s User I D. UFace assumes that the
web service provider is responsible for its own security since if the attacker compromises
the web service provider, the attacker directly gains all control of the user’s account without
the need for authentication. Even so, it is worth noting that the attacker still would not
have the users’ feature vectors to masquerade as the user in other web services. Thus, the
attacker would need to compromise each web service individually to obtain all of the user’s
accounts. UFace also assumes that the user’s phone has an up-to-date operating system
and anti-virus software so that the phone cannot be directly attacked and compromised.
Moreover, to further prevent the attacker from collecting authentication information on the
user’s phone, all the user-end authentication can be performed in the secure zone on the
phone (this varies from manufacturer to manufacturer). Also, the Android app deletes the
photo used to generate the UFacePass after each authentication attempt. This means that
every attempt at authentication is done on a new image.
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The next discussion will cover the scenarios when the attacker breaks into either the
UFace data server or the key server since these two servers are located in a cloud and may
be less protected. The data server possesses only an IndexI D corresponding to the user’s
UFacePass and the key server has nothing with respect to the user. By compromising
both of these authentication servers, the attacker still would not be able to guess the user’s
User I D from the IndexI D since the IndexI D is basically a memory address in the data
server. However, the attacker would be able to decrypt each user’s UFacePass to obtain
the original feature vector. Since the feature vector is just a histogram of different labels in
each of the sections, the attacker would not be able to reconstruct the original image of the
user’s face easily. So if both UFace servers are compromised, the attacker would still not
be able to gain access to a specific user’s account since it would not have the User I D nor
the image used to generate the UFacePass.
Considering a more advanced attack whereby the attacker obtains the User I D as
well, our UFace system still prevents attackers to access a user’s web service account. This
security is based on how the Android application itself works. The application stores the
User I D and the IndexI D for each web service the user registers with and doesn’t allow the
user to re-input once the web service has been registered. Thus, to be able to impersonate
a specific user, the attacker would need to rewrite the Android application to allow for
specific values to be sent for User I D and IndexI D. All the while, the application needs to
maintain the same signature to fool the UFace servers that the Android application has not
been tampered with. Finally, if the attacker manages all of this, then he/she would still need
to convert the feature vector into the image it came from which is a computationally hard
problem. If the attacker would try and crop an image of the user’s face stored online or take
a photo of the user’s face from a distance, then the focal point will be at a different location
which will change the feature vector generated by LBP. The cause for this change is that
when the camera’s focal point is closer to the face, then the picture that is taken will make
the face appear more narrow. Meanwhile, if the picture is taken farther away, the user’s
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(a) Close-up Photo

(b) Zoomed-in Photo

Figure 8.1. Difference between close-up photos vs. zoomed-in photos

face will appear more round. These different facial appearances will cause the respective
feature vectors to be different as well (as long as the grid size is large enough to account for
spatial differences). An example of this difference can be seen in Figure 8.1a and Figure
8.1b which compares the images of 2 different photos of the same face taken with different
focal points making sure the entire face is filling most of the image. Our experiments with
20 users have proved that the LBP algorithm is capable of distinguishing these 2 types of
images (see Section 9 for a detailed walk-through of the comparisons. If the user does
not use a close-up facial photo for registering, then it will be easier for an attacker to crop
out the user’s face from previously stored photos on social media or take a new picture by
zooming in. The further back the original photo was taken, the more easily the attacker can
create a similar image. This is the reason why each photo should be taken extremely close
up so that the user’s face is narrow and fills the entire image.
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8.2.2. Man-in-the-Middle Attack. This is an attack where the attacker acts inbetween the user and the authentication servers trying to fool each party into thinking they
are directly communicating with each other. Many existing techniques, such as Public Key
Infrastructures, can be adopted to help users verify the genuine authentication servers when
establishing the secure communication channel. For example, the user encrypts the session
key using the server’s public key. Then, only the genuine server would be able to decrypt it
and obtain the session key which will be used for the subsequent communication between
the user and the server. Thus, the man-in-the-middle attack can be prevented.
8.2.3. Malleability Attack. An encryption algorithm is malleable if it is possible
for an adversary to transform a ciphertext into another ciphertext. Our protocol is robust
against this because it adopts the secure communication channel established using AES
encryption which has been proven to not be malleable.
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9. EXPERIMENTAL STUDY

In this section, the experimental settings are first introduced followed by the evaluation metrics. Followed this is the experimental setup in which the speed and accuracy of
the mobile application was analyzed.
The UFace system consists of an mobile application for the client side and the
security protocols at the server side. The UFace app was tested on an Android Nexus
5 device which uses the Snapdragon 800 processor (4 cores at 2.3 GHz) and contains 2
GB RAM. The web services, data server, and key server were all run on the same virtual
machine that used an Intel Xeon processor (6 cores at 3.5 GHz) and had 8.5GB of RAM.
All photos taken of users were taken using their own mobile phones and the quality of the
camera varied from each phone. To keep tests comparable, each photo was then tested using
the Android One Plus Three as the client.
The performance of the UFace system is evaluated using two metrics: (i) accuracy,
and (ii) response time. Accuracy refers to the rate at which each user is able to correctly
authenticate into the system using only a close-up picture of their own face and not a zoomedin/cropped picture of the user’s face nor using a different person’s face. Accuracy can thus
be broken into the number of false negatives (true user’s close-up image not working)
and false positives (incorrect user/zoomed-in image of the user’s face able to be used for
authentication). Response time refers to getting the user the authentication results back in
a timely manner; for this system, the time should be within a few seconds so that UFace
can be used in real time. The analysis of [Card et al., 1991, Miller, 1968] show that users
maintain attention when response time is less than 10 seconds, which is something UFace
can guarantee. Table 9.1 summarizes the parameters tested with the highlighted metrics
being the values determined to be best. In what follows, the experiments are reported on
what was done along with the results.
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Table 9.1. Experimental settings
Parameters
Number of users
Number of comparisons per test
Number of bits needed per bin
Encryption key size
LBP threshold
Grid size
Photo Size

Values
20
800
11, 13, 15, 17, 19, 21
1,024 bits
92.78%
1, 4, 16
128×128, 256×256, 512×512, 1,024×1,024

9.1. EXPERIMENT SETUP
The purpose of this experiment was to analyze the accuracy and speed of the UFace
system. The experiment was done using 20 different users all between the age of 22 and
25. Each user provided 3 images for testing using their own mobile devices: 2 different
close-up images and one zoomed-in image. These images were stored on the same Nexus 5
before being tested on that device. All tests were done on the same mobile Android device
even though the photos were taken from different many different devices. One randomly
chosen close-up photo was used to generate the UFacePass to store on the UFace data
server. The other close-up photo and the zoomed-in photo were converted to a UFacePass
and tested against every user’s stored UFacePass. This meant that with 20 users, each
close up photo was tested against 20 × 2 = 40 different images; thus, the total number of
tests for each experiment came out to be 20 × 40 = 800.
These tests were analyzed from varying 2 variables: grid size and photo size. The
grid size varied from having 1 section, to 4 sections, and finally 16 sections. The photo
size varied from having a width/height of 128 pixels each up to 1,024 in powers of 2. Thus,
there were 12 different experiments run each with 800 tests each. Once again, the number
of bits used to represent each bin varied based off the grid and picture size by the following
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equation: log2 Nk + 1 where N is the total number of pixels and k is the grid size. For each
test, the bit size was also changed to be the most optimal value (ie. it means that the entire
bin value can be saved and no bits are missing).
During each of the 800 tests, the accuracy was analyzed by calculating the similarity
of the 2 feature vectors (the close-up image stored on the UFace data server and the test
image). The garbled circuit outputs the histogram intersection of the 2 feature vectors which
is the number of pixels per section of the images that matched. This value was then divided
by the number of pixels in the image to obtain the percentage of similarity between the
2 feature vectors. Finally, for each of the 20 users, the 40 accuracy values were ordered
from greatest to least. By ordering each user’s tests, it was easy to find the number of
true positives/false positives/false negatives by just comparing which image had the highest
comparison value and checking the rank of the image that should correctly match.
The time was analyzed from each different component of the mobile application and
from the time taken to run the garbled circuit. The time taken for message transmission is
omitted since this would vary based on the user’s phone service or home internet service
provider - factors outside of the system’s control. The time for the mobile application
was divided into 3 sections: (1) feature vector generation, (2) data manipulation, and (3)
encryption. The time for the authentication was simply the time taken for the garbled
circuit to run. These 4 components determined the amount of time taken to complete
authentication.

9.2. ACCURACY ANALYSIS
The first step was aimed to identify the picture size, grid size and threshold value
that would achieve the highest accuracy rate. This meant finding the values which would
match the most users correctly while not matching an incorrect user. It also meant that
zoomed-in photos should never be able to be matched with to preserve security of using
online photos.
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Figure 9.1. Graph showing accuracy for a grid size of 1 while picture size varies

For this analysis, the percentage of correctly matched users was compared against
matched incorrect users and unmatched correct users. This test was also done against 3
different threshold values which were calculated from the best matching accuracy average
- AvgBest - and its associated standard deviation - ST DEV. The threshold values are
considered: High, Mid, and Low. High is associated with the threshold value of the
AvgBest − ST DEV, Mid is calculated similarly with AvgBest − 1.5 × ST DEV, and finally
Low is derived from AvgBest − 2 × ST DEV.
9.2.1. Varied Picture Size. The first analysis allowed the picture size to vary while
the grid size was kept constant. The result can be seen in Figures 9.1, 9.2, and 9.3. Each
graph shows the correctly matched users (true positives), incorrectly matched users (false
positives), and incorrectly unmatched users (false negatives). Finally, to track general trends
across different threshold values, the correlation tables and the associated average values
from the graphs can be seen in Tables 9.2, 9.3, and 9.4.
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Figure 9.2. Graph showing accuracy for a grid size of 4 while picture size varies
Table 9.2. Table showing true positive percentages with correlation for varying picture size
Grid Size of 1
Picture Size High Mid
Low
16,384 0.7500 0.8500 0.9500
65,536 0.8000 0.8500 0.8500
262,144 0.8000 0.8000 0.8500
1,048,576 0.8500 0.9000 0.9000
Correlation 0.9487 0.3162 -0.4045

Grid Size of 4
High
Mid
Low
0.8500 0.9500 0.9500
0.8500 0.9000 0.9500
0.8000 0.8500 0.9500
0.8000 0.9000 0.9000
-0.8944 -0.6325 -0.7746

Grid Size of 16
High Mid
Low
0.8500 0.9000 1.0000
0.8000 0.9000 0.9500
0.8500 0.9000 1.000
0.8000 0.9000 0.9500
-0.4472 N/A -0.4472

The results show that across the same grid size and same threshold percentages,
there are a few general trends in the data. The first general trend is that as the picture
size increased, the percentage of correct users decreased. Secondly, as the picture size
increased, the percentage of false positives increased. Finally, as the picture size increased,
the percentage of false negatives decreased. The reason for these results comes from
how the histogram intersection works: summing the minimum value of each bin in the 2
UFacePass and then dividing by the number of pixels in the image. If there are more
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Figure 9.3. Graph showing accuracy for a grid size of 16 while picture size varies
Table 9.3. Table showing false positive percentages with correlation for varying picture size
Grid Size of 1
Picture Size High Mid
Low
16,384 0.0769 0.1538 0.3846
65,536 0.0769 0.3590 0.5641
262,144 0.1538 0.3846 0.5385
1,048,576 0.1282 0.2564 0.3077
Correlation 0.7746 0.4080 -0.2692

Grid Size of 4
High Mid Low
0.0000 0.0256 0.0256
0.0000 0.0000 0.0256
0.0256 0.1026 0.3333
0.0256 0.0513 0.1795
0.8944 0.5292 0.6742

Grid Size of 16
High Mid Low
0.0000 0.0256 0.0256
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0256 0.0769
0.0000 0.0256 0.0769
N/A 0.2582 0.7746

pixels in the image, then each bin should theoretically be larger as well since there are just
more labels per section of the images. Thus, the minimum values are larger with a larger
picture size and so the sum of the minimums is larger, too.
So the reason the percentage of true positives decreased while the percentage of
false positives increased is because with a larger histogram, more labels appear. Thus, if a
test UFacePass is supposed to be a correct match, then there is a higher chance that the
labels appearing in each UFacePass will be different as the picture size increases. On the
other side of this, if a test UFacePass is supposed to fail, then there is a higher chance
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Table 9.4. Table showing false negative percentages with correlation for varying picture
size
Picture Size
16,384
65,536
262,144
1,048,576
Correlation

Grid Size of 1
High
Mid
Low
0.2500 0.1500 0.0500
0.2000 0.1500 0.1500
0.2000 0.2000 0.1500
0.1500 0.1000 0.1000
-0.9487 -0.3162 0.4045

Grid Size of 4
High Mid Low
0.1500 0.0500 0.0500
0.1500 0.1000 0.0500
0.2000 0.1500 0.0500
0.2000 0.1000 0.1000
0.8944 0.6325 0.7746

Grid Size of 16
High Mid Low
0.1500 0.1000 0.0000
0.2000 0.1000 0.0500
0.1500 0.1000 0.0000
0.2000 0.1000 0.0500
0.4472 N/A 0.4472

that more of the similar labels will appear in each UFacePass as the picture size increases.
If the 2 images are a perfect match, however, then there will be no change in accuracy if
the picture size increases. Another reason these change could appear is because for every
different picture size, the threshold value is adjusted to still be related to the AvgBest and
the ST DEV. If the threshold remained constant across every test, then the percentage
of correct users would increase. Therefore, the reason the percentage of false positives
generally increases is because the sum of minimums is larger for a comparison between 2
UFacePasses. Thus, for 2 images of different users or if one is zoomed-in of the user, they
would have a higher probability of matching if there are more pixels in the image. Finally,
the reason the percentage of false negatives increases is because it’s the complement of true
positives. As the number of true positives decrease, then the number of false negatives
increases by the same amount.
9.2.2. Varied Grid Size. The second analysis of the data varied the grid size while
the picture size was kept constant. The result can be seen in the 4 graphs: Figure 9.4, 9.5,
9.6, and 9.7. Again, the tables for each graph can be seen in Tables 9.5, 9.6, and 9.7 which
also show the correlation values for each comparison.
Generally, as the grid size increases, the percentage of true positives increases. Also,
as the grid size increases, the percentage of false positives and false negatives decreases.
The reason for these trends is that as the grid size increases, spatial information plays more
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Figure 9.4. Graph showing accuracy for a picture size of 16,384 while grid size varies
Table 9.5. Table showing true positive percentages with correlation for varying grid size
Picture Size
1
4
16
Correlation

Picture Size of 16,384
High
Mid
Low
0.7500 0.8500 0.9500
0.8500 0.9500 0.9500
0.8500 0.9000 1.0000
0.8660 0.5000 0.8660

Picture Size of 65,536
High
Mid
Low
0.8000 0.8500 0.8500
0.8500 0.9000 0.9500
0.8000 0.9000 0.9500
0.0000 0.8660 0.8660

Picture Size of 262,144
High
Mid
Low
0.8000 0.8000 0.8500
0.8000 0.8500 0.9500
0.8500 0.9000 1.0000
0.8660 1.0000 0.9820

Picture Size of 1,048,576
High
Mid
Low
0.8500 0.9000 0.9000
0.8000 0.9000 0.9000
0.8000 0.9000 0.9500
-0.8660
N/A
0.8660

of a role in comparing 2 images. In smaller grid sizes, a specific pixel near one side of the
section may have a label that matches to the same label as a pixel on the opposite side of the
same section in the other photo. However, in larger grids, the number of pixels per section
decreases and the pixel with the same label might be in a completely different section. This
would mean those 2 labels would not be accounted for in same portion of the histogram and
thus, the difference between the 2 images would be greater than if the pixels were located
in the same section.
Since the spatial information for 2 close-up images of the same user should be similar,
the percentage of true positives should increase. This also means that false positives should
decrease because if the 2 feature vectors don’t come from close-up photos of the same user,
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Figure 9.5. Graph showing accuracy for a picture size of 65,536 while grid size varies
Table 9.6. Table showing false positive percentages with correlation for varying grid size
Picture Size
1
4
16
Correlation

Picture Size of 16,384
High
Mid
Low
0.0769 0.1538 0.3846
0.0000 0.0256 0.0256
0.0000 0.0256 0.0256
-0.8660 -0.8660 -0.8660

Picture Size of 65,536
High
Mid
Low
0.0769 0.3590 0.5641
0.0000 0.0000 0.0256
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
-0.8660 -0.8660 -0.8854

Picture Size of 262,144
High
Mid
Low
0.1538 0.3846 0.5385
0.0256 0.1026 0.3333
0.0000 0.0256 0.0769
-0.9333 -0.9497 -0.9979

Picture Size of 1,048,576
High
Mid
Low
0.1282 0.2564 0.3077
0.0256 0.0513 0.1795
0.0000 0.0256 0.0769
-0.9449 -0.9122 -0.9979

then the spatial information should be different resulting in different histograms. The reason
the false negatives decrease is once again inversely related to the number of true positives
and their increase as grid size increases.
Another reason for the increase in true positives from increasing the grid size is
because the number of pixels in each section decreases. A general trend in the previous
trend was that as picture size increases, the percentage of true positives decreases. The
inverse of this can be true: as picture size decreases the percentage of true positives
increases. By increasing the grid size, the picture size is essentially decreasing for each
section of the UFacePass. Thus, since the number of pixels decreased per each section,
the percentage of matching to only correct UFacePass increased, too.
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Figure 9.6. Graph showing accuracy for a picture size of 262,144 while grid size varies
Table 9.7. Table showing false negative percentages with correlation for varying grid size
Picture Size
1
4
16
Correlation

Picture Size of 16,384
High
Mid
Low
0.2500 0.1500 0.0500
0.1500 0.0500 0.0500
0.1500 0.1000 0.0000
-0.8660 -0.5000 -0.8660

Picture Size of 65,536
High
Mid
Low
0.2000 0.1500 0.1500
0.1500 0.1000 0.0500
0.2000 0.1000 0.0500
0.0000 -0.8660 -0.8660

Picture Size of 262,144
High
Mid
Low
0.2000 0.2000 0.1500
0.2000 0.1500 0.0500
0.1500 0.1000 0.0000
-0.8660 -1.0000 -0.9820

Picture Size of 1,048,576
High
Mid
Low
0.1500 0.1000 0.1000
0.2000 0.1000 0.1000
0.2000 0.1000 0.0500
0.8660
N/A
-0.8660

9.2.3. Best Accuracy Comparison. For determining the best accuracy, false positives should be 0 while true positives should be high (or false negatives being low). False
positives mean that an attacker would be able to access a user’s account. If this value is anything besides a 0, then the system would allow at least 1 attacker access to a user’s account
in just the experiments already completed; this should never happen. False negatives, on
the other hand, should be low, but don’t necessarily have to be 0. False negatives mean that
an attempt at logging in failed for a correct user. So, if this occurs then the user would just
need to attempt to log in once again. However, the higher the false negatives the more likely
a correct user will not be able to access his/her account unless the test image used is nearly
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Figure 9.7. Graph showing accuracy for a picture size of 1,048,576 while grid size varies

identical to the image used to generate the first UFacePass. The final piece of information
in deciding on an ideal picture and grid size is the difference between the threshold value
used and the next best matching incorrect photo.
There needs to be a large enough difference between the threshold value decided
upon and the next best matching incorrect image. If the difference is negative, then there
will be at least 1 false positive, which as already stated is not allowed in this system. If the
difference is positive and close to 0, then it would be more likely that a false positive can
occur with more users when the system is implemented in the real world. Thus, having a
large positive difference between the threshold and the max next best matching incorrect
image is ideal.
Therefore, for determining the best accuracy there were 3 nearly ideal cases each
with 0 false positives: grid size of 2×2 with a picture size of 256×256 with a Mid threshold
value or a grid size of 4 × 4 with a picture size of 256 × 256 with a Mid or Low threshold.
For the case with a grid size of 2 × 2 and picture size 256 × 256, the threshold value was
92.78%. This setting provided 90% correct match rate by matching 18 users with his/her
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second close-up image correctly. This meant that there were 2 out of 18 users that were not
able to authenticate properly (or 10%) on the first try. These users would need to attempt
authentication again to successfully authenticate. It should be noted that difference between
the threshold and the next best matching accuracy value was 0.0071.
The next 2 cases came from using a grid size of 4 × 4 and a picture size of 256 × 256.
The 2 thresholds were 88.65% and 87.61% for the Mid and High case respectively. The
Mid case had provided 90% correct match rate with 10% false negatives. The High case
provided better accuracy with 95% correct match rate and only 5% false negatives. However,
the main difference between these is the difference between the threshold value and the next
best accuracy value: 0.0111 (Mid) and 0.0006 (High). For this case, even though the High
threshold value allowed 1 more person to authenticate on the first try, it’s more likely that
an attacker will be able to gain access compared to using the Mid threshold. Therefore,
between these 2 threshold values, the Mid with a threshold of 88.65% was chosen to be a
better.
There were a few more cases were 0 false positives occurred; however, they resulted
in 3 or more false negatives. For this system, 90% was chosen to be the minimum rate at
which correct users could authenticate on the first try. If the value was any lower, then the
system could be seen to be unreliable.

9.3. TIME ANALYSIS
Now that accuracy has been analyzed and 2 cases stand out, the time needs to be
analyzed to see if authentication can be done in real-time. This section analyses the time
taken to authenticate a user based off both the time taken to run the garbled circuit and the
time taken for the mobile device to create the encrypted feature vector.
9.3.1. Mobile Time Analysis. The amount of time UFace is operating on the
mobile device can be seen in Figure 9.8.

55

Figure 9.8. Graph showing the average total mobile time for each experiment

The general trend is that by increasing either the grid size or the picture size, the
amount of time will increase for the mobile device. The reason for this increase is because
as the picture size increases, the LBP protocol needs to be executed on more pixels which
takes more time - this can be seen in Figure 9.9.
Also, if the grid size increases, there will be more bins that need to be concatenated
together and then encrypted before being sent to the UFace data server. The way grid size
affects the time for encryption can be seen in Figure 9.10.
Finally, Figure 9.11 shows the entire amount of time needed for the UFace application
to run on a mobile device. In Figure 9.11, there are 2 extra segments in the column - average
manipulation time and average resize time. The average manipulation time generally
increases as grid size increases; however, the amount of time taken is tiny in comparison
to the time needed for LBP and encryption. Resize time is the time needed to change an
image into one that can used in the UFace system; this time does increase as the picture size
increases, but it increases at a slower rate compared to LBP execution. See the Table 9.8 to
see how much time is taken for every aspect of the mobile application.
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Figure 9.9. Graph showing the average total LBP execution time for each experiment

The time taken for LBP is completely dependent on the number of pixels, and has a
linear relationship. The time taken to encrypt the feature vector is also a linear relationship
with the number of needed encryptions; however, the number of encryptions increases at
a non-linear rate. The number of decryptions is dependent on the number of bits needed
to completely encompass all values possible in any bin of the histogram and the number of
bins in the histogram. Since the number of bits needed follows the equation log2 Nk + 1 and
the number of bins comes from the equation k × 59, the total number of encryptions then
becomes:

Countencr yptions = d

k × 59
c
b log1024
N
+1

e

(9.1)

2 k

For the experimental setup, the amount of time to execute LBP on any specific pixel
was roughly 0.00132 ms while the time for a single encryption was 16.391 ms. As a simple
example, for the case with a picture size of 65,536 and a grid size of 4, the time taken for LBP
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Figure 9.10. Graph showing the average total encryption time for each experiment

would be roughly 0.00132 × 65, 536 = 86.5075 ms which is similar to the 86.3175 ms as
seen in Table 9.8. The number of encryptions would be equal to 4 and 4 × 16.391 = 65.564
ms which is similar to the 66.7225 ms as seen in Table 9.8.
9.3.2. Garbled Circuit Time Analysis. The other portion of time spend executing
UFace was the time spent executing the authentication protocol through garbled circuits.
Figure 9.12 displays the data and Table 9.9 shows the values.
Increasing the grid size increased the amount of time needed to execute the protocol.
The reason for this is that as the grid size increased, the number of bins needed increased
as well and thus, the garbled circuit needed to be larger to run the protocol over all of the
bins. And since the garbled circuit was larger, it took more time to execute. Increasing
the picture size played no significant role in changing the amount of time needed for the
GC to run for the smaller 2 grid sizes. However, when the grid size was large, then
as the picture size increased the number of encryptions needed increased more rapidly.
The number of encryptions doesn’t necessarily play a role in executing the authentication
protocol; however, it does play a role in the time for the proper data to be used as input to
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Figure 9.11. Graph showing the average total time expanding each component of mobile
time for each experiment

the garbled circuit. The reasoning behind this is that, these encryptions relate to a specific
number of bins across 1 grid size (ie. if the grid size remains constant, then the number
of bins remains constant too - and thus the number of inputs into the garbled circuit). As
the picture size increases, these encrypted values needed to be first decrypted and then the
random value provided to it from the UFace data server needs to be removed (see Section
7.2). This happens within the garbled circuit, so the time does get affected by varying the
picture size when the grid size is large enough.
9.3.3. Total Time Analysis. The total time taken can be seen in Figure 9.13. In
every possible case, the amount of time required to authenticate a user would require less
than 7 seconds; in most cases, the time would be less than 5 seconds. However, this time
needs to be comparable to the time a typical login would need. As stated in 9, if the time
was less than 10 seconds, then users would remain attentive. No experimental setup took
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Table 9.8. Table showing the average total time expanding each component of mobile time
for each experiment
Picture Size
16,384
16,384
16,384
65,536
65,536
65,536
262,144
262,144
262,144
1,048,576
1,048,576
1,048,576

Grid Size
1
4
16
1
4
16
1
4
16
1
4
16

Resize Time
82.5625
80.44375
75.37625
84.0325
84.05
82.14375
87.28875
86.17
79.8775
98.08625
98.575
101.075

LBP Time
22.4875
22.11
19.87
85.49125
86.3175
88.9575
349.29
347.79
312.965
1,434.78375
1,424.19
1,423.05625

Manipulation Time
0.03625
0.135
0.37375
0.04125
0.1325
0.4525
0.065
0.15125
0.4
0.05875
0.1425
0.455

Encryption Time
17.24625
65.79875
160.20625
16.81375
66.7225
214.2275
32.54625
66.87125
204.50875
33.265
83.2975
269.16

Total Time
122.3325
168.4875
255.82625
186.37875
237.2225
385.78125
469.19
500.9825
597.75125
1,566.19375
1,606.205
1,793.74625

that long and thus, UFace can work in a real setting; however, having a system faster than 7
seconds would be ideal. Thus, the accuracy needs to be analyzed with the time to find the
ideal parameters.

9.4. IDEAL PARAMETERS ANALYSIS
Back in Section 9.2, there were 2 cases that provided 90% accuracy for correct users
with 0 false positives. The first used a grid size of 2 × 2 and a picture size of 256 × 256. The
average total amount of time for a single authentication attempt was 2830.48 milliseconds
or roughly 2.8 seconds. For the case with a grid size of 4 × 4 and a picture size of 256 × 256
the average total time was 4,414.56 milliseconds or about 4.4 seconds. The time with the
larger grid size was about 1.57 times larger than the case with the smaller grid size and only
provided a difference of nearly 0.004 for the threshold against the next best matching value.
With these 2 different cases, it seems that the smaller grid size was more ideal since the
average total time was under 3 seconds and they both provided the same accuracy values.
The ideal values are highlighted in Table 9.1. Table 9.10 shows the accuracy values and
times for each experiment and the highlighted values are the ideal values used.
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Figure 9.12. Graph showing the average Garbled Circuit time for each experiment

Table 9.9. Table showing the average Garbled Circuit time for each experiment
Picture Size Grid Size Average Garbled Circuit Time
16,384
1
1,915.84125
65,536
1
1,885.1175
262,144
1
2,085.71375
1,048,576
1
2,098.87625
16,384
4
2,566.95625
65,536
4
2,593.2575
262,144
4
2,596.1575
1,048,576
4
2,770.56375
16,384
16
3,609.5475
65,536
16
4,028.7825
262,144
16
4,163.6275
1,048,576
16
4,454.64625
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Figure 9.13. Graph showing the average total time slices for each experiment
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Table 9.10. Table showing average accuracy and time analysis for all experiments
Grid
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16

Picture
16,384
16,384
16,384
65,536
65,536
65,536
262,144
262,144
262,144
1,048,576
1,048,576
1,048,576
16,384
16,384
16,384
65,536
65,536
65,536
262,144
262,144
262,144
1,048,576
1,048,576
1,048,576
16,384
16,384
16,384
65,536
65,536
65,536
262,144
262,144
262,144
1,048,576
1,048,576
1,048,576

Level
High
Mid
Low
High
Mid
Low
High
Mid
Low
High
Mid
Low
High
Mid
Low
High
Mid
Low
High
Mid
Low
High
Mid
Low
High
Mid
Low
High
Mid
Low
High
Mid
Low
High
Mid
Low

Threshold
0.9461
0.9401
0.9341
0.9549
0.9481
0.9412
0.9514
0.9424
0.9334
0.9541
0.9450
0.9359
0.9120
0.9041
0.8962
0.9354
0.9278
0.9202
0.9325
0.9208
0.9091
0.9398
0.9283
0.9168
0.8496
0.8370
0.8244
0.8970
0.8865
0.8761
0.9096
0.8967
0.8838
0.9197
0.9063
0.8929

T. Pos.
15
17
19
16
17
17
16
16
17
17
18
18
17
19
19
17
18
19
16
17
19
16
18
18
17
18
20
16
18
19
17
18
20
16
18
19

F. Neg.
5
3
1
4
3
3
4
4
3
3
2
2
3
1
1
3
2
1
4
3
1
4
2
2
3
2
0
4
2
1
3
2
0
4
2
1

F. Pos.
3
6
15
3
14
22
6
15
21
5
10
12
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
4
13
1
2
7
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
3
0
1
3

Difference
-0.0106
-0.0166
-0.0226
-0.0130
-0.0198
-0.0267
-0.0170
-0.0260
-0.0350
-0.0143
-0.0234
-0.0325
0.0066
-0.0013
-0.0092
0.0148
0.0071
-0.0005
-0.0039
-0.0156
-0.0273
0.0000
-0.0116
-0.0231
0.0092
-0.0033
-0.0159
0.0215
0.0111
0.0006
0.0068
-0.0061
-0.0190
0.0079
-0.0055
-0.0190

GC Time
1,915.8413
1,915.8413
1,915.8413
1,885.1175
1,885.1175
1,885.1175
2,085.7138
2,085.7138
2,085.7138
2,098.8763
2,098.8763
2,098.8763
2,566.9563
2,566.9563
2,566.9563
2,593.2575
2,593.2575
2,593.2575
2,596.1575
2,596.1575
2,596.1575
2,770.5638
2,770.5638
2,770.5638
3,609.5475
3,609.5475
3,609.5475
4,028.7825
4,028.7825
4,028.7825
4,163.6275
4,163.6275
4,163.6275
4,454.6463
4,454.6463
4,454.6463

Mobile Time
122.3325
122.3325
122.3325
186.3788
186.3788
186.3788
469.1900
469.1900
469.1900
1,566.1938
1,566.1938
1,566.1938
168.4875
168.4875
168.4875
237.2225
237.2225
237.2225
500.9825
500.9825
500.9825
1,606.2050
1,606.2050
1,606.2050
255.8263
255.8263
255.8263
385.7813
385.7813
385.7813
597.7513
597.7513
597.7513
1,793.7463
1,793.7463
1,793.7463

Total Time
2,038.1738
2,038.1738
2,038.1738
2,071.4963
2,071.4963
2,071.4963
2,554.9038
2,554.9038
2,554.9038
3,665.0700
3,665.0700
3,665.0700
2,735.4438
2,735.4438
2,735.4438
2,830.4800
2,830.4800
2,830.4800
3,097.1400
3,097.1400
3,097.1400
4,376.7688
4,376.7688
4,376.7688
3,865.3738
3,865.3738
3,865.3738
4,414.5638
4,414.5638
4,414.5638
4,761.3788
4,761.3788
4,761.3788
6,248.3925
6,248.3925
6,248.3925
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10. CONCLUSION

In this paper, a novel privacy-preserving face authentication system was presented,
called UFace, for authenticating web services on a mobile device. UFace is unique in
that it allows a web service to offload its authentication computation while still securely
authenticating any of its users. UFace is also able to authenticate users without the need
to store facial image in its database. Instead, UFace maintains a database of encrypted
facial image feature vectors and uses a garbled circuit technique to compare these feature
vectors without leaking data. UFace is able to correctly authenticate 90% of the users that
were tested while preventing 0 masquerade attacks. All the while, UFace can complete
authentication in less than 3 seconds which can be used in many systems today. Since
UFace is correct, fast, and prevents multiple types of attacks, it has the capability to be the
central authentication protocol for any future web service.
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